China has suspended nuclear arms control talks with the US. Here’s why.

Responding to a question during a regular press conference, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Lin Jian said: “The Chinese side has decided to postpone talks with the United States on a new round of consultations on arms control and non-proliferation.” Reuters described the decision as “a protest against Washington’s arms sales to the democratically governed island of Taiwan.” But Lin’s detailed statement and the disappointing outcome of government and non-government talks between American and Chinese arms control experts suggest there may be other reasons for the Chinese leadership’s suspension of talks.

Lin mentioned U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, but noted, without specifying, that there are other U.S. behaviors that complicate building the mutual trust that Lin called a “necessary prerequisite” for constructive bilateral talks on nuclear arms control. The last two U.S. administrations have labeled China a “strategic competitor,” denigrated scientific cooperation, imposed economic tariffs, and restricted Chinese access to key technologies, markets, and investments. They also increased U.S. military activities on China’s periphery and encouraged U.S. allies to do the same. When Lin said the “political climate for continuing arms control consultations” was “seriously compromised,” he wasn’t just referring to arms sales to Taiwan.

China’s decision to suspend talks followed two key meetings with U.S. counterparts. The first was an official meeting in Washington in November 2023. The Chinese delegation was led by State Department Director General for Arms Control Sun Xiaobo. Mallory Stewart, the assistant secretary of state for arms control, verification and compliance, led the U.S. group. The two diplomats did not issue a joint statement after the meeting, most likely because the two sides left with different unfulfilled expectations. U.S. participants had hoped for more transparency about China’s current and future nuclear capabilities. A senior U.S. official complained that the U.S. government had learned nothing new. The Chinese side apparently saw no signs that the United States would consider abandoning “strategic competition” in favor of the “joint, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable” security approach preferred by the Chinese government.

The second meeting was held four months later in Shanghai, at the same hotel where President Richard Nixon and Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai had signed the Shanghai Communiqué in 1972. Although this was a “Track II” meeting without government representation, the qualifications and professional experience of the participants suggest it was important, especially for the Chinese. Hu Side, a former head of China’s nuclear weapons laboratory who played a leading role in developing China’s nuclear weapons program and continues to advise the Chinese leadership on nuclear weapons and arms control policy, led the Chinese team. Linton Brooks, a former administrator of the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration who has spent most of his career developing and implementing U.S. nuclear weapons policy, was scheduled to lead the U.S. delegation but was unable to make the trip. Many of the Chinese and American participants had attended similar U.S.-China talks in the past and know each other well.

The agenda included sessions on crisis management, confidence-building measures, nuclear weapons policy and US-China relations. US organiser David Santoro told Reuters that the Chinese had assured US participants that China would not be the first to use nuclear weapons under any circumstances, even if there was war over Taiwan. Santoro also reported that the Chinese had said their government’s nuclear weapons policy had not changed. Their aim was to maintain a credible ability to retaliate if China was attacked first. Chinese decision-makers were not seeking numerical parity with the US, let alone numerical superiority.

Santoro did not tell Reuters what the U.S. side told the Chinese, but overall the U.S. message did not go down well. A long-time Chinese participant in these non-governmental dialogues, which have been running for nearly twenty years, told UCS that he had “lost heart” in the process. He said, “The window of opportunity for China and the United States to avoid an arms race has closed.” And in his view, the blame clearly lies with the U.S. “The United States has completed its domestic mobilization against China, and China has yet to realize the severity of the consequences.” Comments from other Chinese participants were less pessimistic, but not encouraging. The opinions of this elite community of Chinese arms control experts were summarized and passed on to senior Chinese officials. It is very likely that these opinions played a role in the Chinese leadership’s decision to suspend the official talks.

Although the situation looks bleak in the short term, China seems determined to prepare for a more promising future. The Chinese sent 17 people to the Shanghai talks, as well as a group of young scientists and analysts. Despite initial objections from the United States, the Chinese insisted that the agenda include a 90-minute “young scientists’ forum” where the next generation of Chinese arms control experts could gain valuable experience. It was undeniably a hopeful investment by China in the long-term future of nuclear arms control negotiations, and one that should prompt U.S. officials who accuse China of bad faith to reconsider their negative assessment of Chinese intentions.