Kanchanjunga Express train accident is the result of failure at all levels of the railway hierarchy

This is hardly the path the newly sworn-in Union government had expected – a train crash in Darjeeling, the picturesque hill town in West Bengal. Worse still, sources say. Frontline that the train accident was the result of errors at several levels of the railway hierarchy and was not due solely to human or mechanical failure.

So what happened? On June 17 at 8:55 am, a freight train loaded with containers rammed the Kolkata-bound Kanchanjunga Express, killing 10 people, seriously injuring nine others and injuring 32 others. Railway officials investigating the accident say that several levels of the organisation were unaware of the rules and procedures or deliberately violated them.

Railway rules regarding the failure of track circuits

The Darjeeling section of the railway line experienced electrical circuit failures due to thunderstorms and lightning. This resulted in the failure of automatic signals between Rangapani and Chatterhat at 5:50 am on June 17. The Railway has General and Supplementary Rules (G&SR) governing such failures and failures. As per the Railway’s G&SR 9.12/1, the working system changes from automatic block system to absolute block system when the signalling department declares the failure as ‘persistent’ or ‘likely to continue for some time or cause considerable delay’. The signalling failure on this section has not been declared as a persistent failure.

Railway rules state that if automatic signals fail, a train must stop at each signal for approximately one minute and travel at less than 10 km/h between signals. Trains are issued with written permission and a “track clearance ticket” to pass the signals.

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It is important to remember that the power failure occurred a few hours before the departure of the Kanchanjunga Express. During this time, seven trains were allowed to pass the signals.

As per G&SR 9.01, all the seven trains departing from Rangapani station after the incident were issued authority T/A 912. Thereafter, Train No. DN 13174 Kanchanjunga Exp (Agartala-Sealdah) proceeded as per the above G&SR position and authority issued and halted at the signals. It halted for the prescribed time at signal number ‘AS650’ between Rangapani and Chatterhat stations.

Two trains, one track

The goods train had left Rangapani with the same permission, even though there was another train on the same section. According to railway laws, in case of faulty signals, only one train can be in a section: one on the up track and one on the down track. “That did not happen on this section. Subsequent trains were given permission to proceed,” a source said.

In fact, when a signal failed, the same procedure was applied that is used when automatic signals are working properly. Otherwise, the container train would have been stopped at the previous station and would not have received a “clear” signal until it reached the next station.

T/A 912 is only part of the power of attorney and represents permission to proceed over multiple faulty signals. Another sheet of paper called a “Line Clear Ticket” must also be issued according to the railroad’s rules and procedures. T/A 912, along with the Line Clear Ticket, gives authority for a train to proceed from one station to the next. Without both, a train cannot proceed. The second form was not given to the driver of the freight train.

By all accounts, none of those involved in train operations knew that this was a necessary condition for a train to move from one station to another. No fewer than seven trains had passed through this section. This means that the rule of not moving without a line-clear ticket was almost routinely flouted. This includes the station masters of both stations, the train drivers and conductors in the catchment area (in this case the North Frontier Railway), the controllers at the district headquarters and their superiors at divisional, zonal and railway levels.

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“It can be assumed that in previous signal failures, this procedure was followed. That is, no one questions it, no one noticed it,” the source said. It also means that no inspection has found any discrepancies, and it also means that the oversight put in place at every level – from the railway board to the department – has not worked.

All rules ignored

A railway source said that according toThe signalman at NC 9 (which is about 1 km from the accident site) and the train driver stated that the freight train was travelling at 40-50 km/h instead of the recommended 10 km/h in the event of signal failure.