South Korea, diplomatic tensions and the radar lock-on incident

On June 1, Japan and South Korea met in Singapore for a meeting of their defense ministers. Both countries agreed to avoid future military incidents that could affect bilateral relations. One notable incident in the past was the radar detection of a Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) aircraft by the South Korean Navy. Aside from the bitterness of that incident, the June 1 agreement is intended to facilitate the resumption of defense exchanges.

However, the delay in clarifying the facts has caused great discontent among conservative factions in Japan, including the Liberal Democratic Party. Japan has ample evidence to support its claims, making South Korea’s outright denials unfounded and implausible. However, it recently came to light that South Korean military personnel unofficially explained the entire sequence of events to Japan. Their statements included suppressing the truth behind the incident, allegedly “on the orders of then-President Moon Jae In.”

Context and controversy

The radar detection incident occurred at around 15:00 on December 20, 2018, off the Noto Peninsula in Japan’s exclusive economic zone. An MSDF P-1 patrol aircraft was conducting routine surveillance in the area, also known as the Yamatotai fishing area.

Without warning, it was suddenly targeted by a 3,200-ton South Korean destroyer with a fire control radar. Although the P-1 attempted to radio the destroyer to inquire about its intentions, it received no response. South Korean coast guard vessels and small boats that appeared to be fishing vessels were in the vicinity of the destroyer.

Tokyo immediately lodged a strong protest with Seoul. South Korea stated through diplomatic channels that it had been searching for a missing North Korean fishing boat. According to the South Korean Ministry of Defense (MND), “radar was used during the operation, but not to track a patrol aircraft.” In addition, South Korean media reports stated that the Republic of Korea Navy admitted to using fire control radar.

However, five days after the incident, the Ministry of Defence completely changed course, denying that there had been any radar detection and stating: “Cameras were used, but no detection occurred.”

From that point on, Seoul persisted in its denial, demanded an apology from Japan and condemned the low-level flight of the Japanese patrol aircraft as dangerous. On January 21, 2019, the Japanese government issued an unprecedented “final statement.” It then broke off talks with South Korea.

As if it never happened

A former official at Japan’s Ministry of Defense (MOD) stated, “It seems that the South Korean MND intended to tell Japan the truth.” About a week after the incident, a contact within the MND informed his Japanese colleagues of the timeline of events.

According to their conversation, events unfolded as follows.

Then-South Korean Defense Minister Jeong Kyeong-doo reportedly informed the Blue House (the president’s office) of the incident. President Moon Jae In then ordered him to “act as if this never happened.” As a result, the Defense Ministry was virtually silenced on the matter. Nevertheless, Jeong asked some retired South Korean military officials to provide full details to Japanese Defense Ministry officials.

Pyongyang asked the Blue House to arrest people who had escaped on a fishing boat. A destroyer conducting exercises nearby rushed to the scene. When the P1 spotted the destroyer, it was in the process of recovering the body of a North Korean who had jumped into the sea. The South Korean military recovered three North Korean defectors and one body. Two days later, the Unification Ministry announced that they had been repatriated to North Korea. However, no footage or photos of the repatriation were released.

Something to hide?

A retired Defense Department official testified: “I heard that the military sent them back to North Korea four or five hours after they were transported to the port.” Why were they in such a hurry?

If this report is accurate, it suggests that the South Korean destroyer was very afraid of being filmed by the P1 during the operation. This would explain why it resorted to the drastic measure of radar detection. In addition, the Moon administration probably feared that Japan’s investigation would expose its complicity with North Korea in the request.

“It seemed that the Defense Ministry was willing to acknowledge the truth and apologize,” the retired Japanese defense official explained. “However, they were under strict presidential orders prohibiting any disclosure. It is possible that they intended to pass this on to the Japanese government.” Although the Shinzo Abe administration was reportedly made aware of this, government officials apparently treated it as unofficial information.

Political considerations and strategic implications

Former Defense Minister General Nakatani is well versed in the details of the radar detection case. He has repeatedly pointed out that the Defense Ministry initially admitted the radar detection but later claimed it “never happened.”

“I viewed this as an incident where political considerations influenced military actions,” Nakatani reflected. On the recent decision to postpone the resolution of the matter, he said: “The radar incident became a thorn in the side of the improving relations between the leaders. I think it was a pragmatic decision that resuming exchanges serves national interests.”

At the time, Vice Admiral Yoji Koda, former commander of the MSDF, meticulously analyzed the video footage. “It was strange that both destroyers and the maritime police approached a ship in distress,” he noted. “Based on my extensive experience in sea rescues, I can say with certainty that it bore no resemblance to a typical rescue operation. They did not even attempt to throw out a rope.” Koda’s analysis debunked South Korea’s false claims.

He also addressed the resumption of defense exchanges between Japan and South Korea. “We must consider possible eventualities on the Korean peninsula or in the Taiwan Strait. If Tokyo and Seoul do not become important strategic partners, we will become the laughing stock of our enemies.”

The North Korea connection

Is it possible to re-examine the facts concealed by the previous government? Some speculate that the repatriated defectors were the target of a large-scale purge.

Under Kim Jong Un’s regime, the leadership of the Korean Workers’ Party carried out this purge between May and December 2018. This investigation targeted high-ranking officials of the Supreme Guard Command (SGC), Kim’s personal bodyguard. Since 2019, reports from Japan and South Korea have documented the arrest and execution of several such officials. The prevailing theory is that the suspects were accused of an alleged assassination attempt on Kim Jong Un.

Tsutomu Nishioka is a visiting professor at Reitaku University and an expert on Korean Peninsula affairs. “Sources in North Korea indicate that among the people herded around Yamatotai were three high-ranking officials from the SGC,” he says. “They fled with the agency’s director because they feared the regime would weed them out.”

In addition, according to Nishioka, “Pyongyang reportedly asked key figures in the Moon government to arrest and hand over the four men. In response, the South Korean navy was mobilized. At that time, the SDF aircraft reportedly approached and the South Korean destroyer aimed its fire control radar at them.

In Japan and South Korea, the debate has been about whether or not radar detection occurred, but the key point is why it happened.

Yoon Suk-yeol’s government wants to uncover any collusion between the Moon government and North Korea in connection with the radar incident. This could help clarify the facts.

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Read the article in Japanese.

Author: Ruriko Kubota